The last 48 hours: the whole book's closing checklists, chapter by chapter. Use it after a miss to find the rule that failed you; the rule index (a separate PDF in the set) finds anything that still feels soft.
Chapter 1 · Admission, discipline, and reporting Chapter 2 · Unauthorized and multijurisdictional practice Chapter 3 · Supervision, nonlawyer assistance, and leaving a firm Chapter 5 · Fees and termination A fee isn't reasonable merely because the client signed; Rule 1.5(a)'s objective test applies regardless of client agreement. A contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case is prohibited without exception; no compliant writing can cure an absolute prohibition. Every outside-firm fee split must satisfy all three Rule 1.5(e) conditions: division in proportion to services or with joint responsibility; client agreement, including each lawyer's share, confirmed in writing; and a reasonable total fee. Mandatory withdrawal: only the four Rule 1.16(a) grounds compel it — continuing would itself require violating the Rules or other law; the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the representation; the lawyer is discharged; or, after the lawyer has explained the limits on assisting, the client or prospective client seeks to use or persists in using the lawyer's services to commit or further a crime or fraud — and the same four grounds bar accepting the matter in the first place. Where applicable law requires notice to or permission of the tribunal, comply before terminating — a mandatory ground does not excuse that step, and a lawyer ordered to continue must continue. Upon termination, take reasonably practicable steps to protect the client — reasonable notice, time to find new counsel, refund of unearned fees, return of papers — mandatory or voluntary departure alike, unfair discharge included. Rule 5.6 bars a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar type of agreement restricting post-departure practice (retirement-benefit conditions excepted) and a settlement conditioned on such a restriction; Rule 1.17 practice sales sit outside. Chapter 6 · Attorney-client privilege and work product Chapter 7 · Confidentiality: the duty and its exceptions Chapter 9 · Imputation, government lawyers, and organizational clients Rule 1.10 imputes conflicts firm-wide — except a purely personal-interest conflict that poses no significant risk of materially limiting the other lawyers' representation ; screening cures only prior-firm conflicts; current-firm conflicts need a Rule 1.7 waiver. A proper Rule 1.10(a)(2) screen requires timely isolation, no fee share from the matter, and written notice to the former client with certifications of compliance. A former government lawyer can't represent a client on a matter they personally and substantially handled without the agency's informed consent, confirmed in writing; screening, no fee apportionment, and agency notice cure imputation. Under Rule 1.11(c), notice to the agency isn't required — that's the critical difference from Rule 1.11(b). A former neutral needs written consent from all parties to the original proceeding before personally representing anyone in that matter; the bar is not limited to the parties, and a majority's consent is not enough. Rule 1.13 duty runs to the entity: refer up (the default, unless the lawyer reasonably believes it unnecessary in the entity's best interest) before any Rule 1.13(c) outside disclosure, which is permissive, never mandatory. Rule 1.13 neither limits nor expands what Rules 1.8, 1.16, 3.3 and 4.1 require. Rule 3.7 personally disqualifies the lawyer-witness as trial advocate (firm not automatically out) unless testimony concerns an uncontested issue or the nature and value of legal services, or disqualification would cause the client substantial hardship. Chapter 10 · Specific conflicts under Rule 1.8 Rule 1.8 is a catalog of specific prohibitions — identify which sub-rule governs the fact pattern before applying its conditions. All four DRAW conditions for 1.8(a) must be met; three require something in writing, and a signed deal-term contract isn't the same as the client's informed consent to the lawyer's role. Financial assistance under 1.8(e), three tiers: outcome-contingent advance (any client); outright payment (indigent client); modest basic-living gifts (pro bono indigent client, direct or through a nonprofit, public-interest or law-school program) — no promising, assuring or implying availability, no reimbursement from the client, a relative of the client or anyone affiliated with the client, no advertising. Literary rights under 1.8(d) are barred prior to the conclusion of representation of a client — the trigger is the end of the lawyer's representation, not the end of the matter. Third-party compensation under 1.8(f) has three conditions: the client's informed consent (no writing required), no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or the client-lawyer relationship, and information protected as required by Rule 1.6. Aggregate settlement under 1.8(g) requires each client's informed consent in a writing signed by the client , plus disclosure of the existence and nature of all claims or pleas involved and each person's participation. The 1.8(j) sexual-relations bar is personal to the involved lawyer and is not imputed under Rule 1.8(k); a coexisting Rule 1.7(a)(2) personal-interest conflict is still tested under Rule 1.10(a)(1). The reverse: Rule 1.8(k) applies paragraphs (a)–(i) to every lawyer in the firm, so a lawyer who never touched the matter is still bound by (for example) Rule 1.8(a) as to another lawyer's client. Chapter 11 · Competence, diligence, and discipline Competence requires legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation (KSTP) as the matter demands — often a general practitioner's proficiency; a newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a veteran; client consent is no defense. Among other routes, a competence gap closes by associating or consulting with competent counsel, necessary study or reasonable preparation, or, failing those, reasonably necessary emergency advice or assistance; Rule 1.1 counts none of them. Retaining or contracting with a lawyer outside the firm is the separate step carrying the reasonable-belief and informed-consent duties; what the client may be billed for study time is a Rule 1.5(a) question. Technology currency belongs to Rule 1.1 through Comment [8]: a lawyer should understand the benefits and risks of the relevant technology used in the representation. A single act of neglect suffices for Rule 1.3 discipline, and a single misleading status communication suffices under Rule 1.4(a)(3) and Rule 8.4(c); no pattern is required. Rule 1.3 Comment 5: diligence may require sole practitioners to keep a succession plan designating a lawyer to review files, notify clients, and determine any immediate protective action; writing is prudence, not rule text. Discipline requires no harm; malpractice requires actual harm and but-for causation — read the call of the question to know which track applies. Chapter 12 · Malpractice and civil liability Chapter 13 · Meritorious claims and candor to the tribunal Rule 3.1 sets a low bar: any good-faith argument clears it; probable loss alone never makes a position frivolous. Financial advantage from otherwise improper delay is not a legitimate client interest under Rule 3.2. Never knowingly make a false statement to a tribunal; correct any prior false statement of material fact or law as soon as you learn the truth, regardless of whether the court has acted on it. Disclose adverse controlling authority not cited by opposing counsel; you may then distinguish it — artful distinction is permissible, concealment is not. When false evidence surfaces, follow the three-step protocol: counsel the client, seek withdrawal, then disclose to the tribunal if all else fails. Rule 3.3(b), adjudicative proceedings: take reasonable remedial measures (disclosure to the tribunal if necessary) when you know anyone, client or not, intends, is engaging, or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to it. Rule 3.3(d): in an ex parte proceeding, volunteer every material fact you know that will enable an informed decision, adverse ones included. Candor overrides confidentiality; the duty runs until the proceeding fully concludes, not merely until trial closes. Chapter 14 · Fairness to the opposing party and the tribunal Litigation in view converts routine document destruction into unlawful obstruction; the duty to preserve arises when litigation is reasonably anticipated, not when suit is filed. Contingent compensation is barred for every witness; a fact witness may get reasonable expenses, reasonable loss-of-time compensation and statutory appearance fees (the ABA position, not Rule 3.4(b)'s text); an expert, a reasonable fee plus expenses. "I believe" is prohibited vouching, except when the lawyer is testifying as a witness; "the evidence shows" is argument unless the lawyer does not reasonably believe the matter is relevant or supportable by admissible evidence. Rule 4.4(b) requires only notifying the sender of an inadvertently sent document or electronically stored information (metadata included); absent a legal duty to return, Comment [3] leaves return to professional judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer (Rules 1.2, 1.4); Comment [2]: not a document the sender obtained inappropriately. Juror contact during the proceeding: prohibited ex parte on any topic unless law or court order authorizes it; after discharge, only law or court order, juror objection, or misrepresentation, coercion, duress, or harassment bars it. Chapter 15 · Trial publicity, the lawyer as witness, and the prosecutor Chapter 17 · Unrepresented persons and third-party rights Chapter 18 · The lawyer as counselor, negotiator, and neutral Chapter 19 · Prosecutors, public roles, and the organization as client Prosecutors may not go forward on a charge they actually know lacks probable cause; the test is actual knowledge, not what a diligent prosecutor would have found out, and a later conviction doesn't cure it. Rule 3.8(b)–(c): make reasonable efforts to see that the accused has been advised of the right to counsel and of how to obtain it and given a reasonable opportunity to obtain it; seek no important pretrial-right waiver from an unrepresented accused. All evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate guilt or mitigate the offense: timely disclosure to the defense; at sentencing, unprivileged mitigating information goes to defense and tribunal, except where a protective order of the tribunal relieves the prosecutor. New, credible, material evidence raising a reasonable likelihood of wrongful conviction requires prompt court disclosure and, for in-jurisdiction convictions, defendant disclosure plus investigation; clear-and-convincing evidence of innocence requires affirmative steps to remedy the conviction. Rule 3.8(e): no subpoena to a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding about a client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes all three — no applicable privilege, evidence essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution, and no feasible alternative. Rule 3.8(f): no extrajudicial comments with a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused, except statements necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action that serve a legitimate law-enforcement purpose, plus reasonable care to keep investigators, law-enforcement staff, and other assisting persons from saying what the prosecutor could not. Before a legislature or administrative agency, the appearance must be disclosed as representative in character; failure to name the client is not the violation — failure to disclose the representative status is. When the lawyer knows a constituent's conduct in a matter related to the representation violates a duty to the entity or a law imputable to it and is likely to cause substantial injury, refer up (to the highest authority that can act if the circumstances warrant) unless the lawyer reasonably believes it unnecessary in the entity's best interest. ABA external reporting after the board fails is permissive ("may"); SOX escalation to the board after CLO failure is mandatory ("must") — never swap those words on the exam. Chapter 20 · Safekeeping client property Chapter 21 · Advertising and solicitation Every communication about legal services — including firm names, letterheads, and office signage — must satisfy Rule 7.1's non-misleading standard; a technically true statement that omits a critical qualifier still violates. When a partner takes a substantial public-office appointment and stops practicing, the firm name must change for the duration of the absence; stated intent to return is not the test. No percentage of fees and no per-referral payment may be paid for a recommendation (a Rule 1.5(e) division with a lawyer who assumes joint responsibility is a fee split, not a referral payment). Rule 7.2(b): the five narrow exceptions to the anything-of-value bar are advertising costs, legal-service-plan and not-for-profit or qualified referral-service charges, practice-acquisition payments, a nonexclusive reciprocal referral agreement disclosed to the client, and nominal gifts with no prior arrangement, neither intended nor reasonably expected to be compensation. "Certified specialist" requires actual certification from an approved organization and identification of that organization in the communication; years of exclusive experience do not substitute. Rule 7.3: live contact (face-to-face, phone, real-time video) with a specific prospect is solicitation, barred when a significant motive is the lawyer's or law firm's pecuniary gain, unless the target is a lawyer, has a family, close personal, or prior business or professional relationship with the lawyer or firm, or is a routine business user (LPR). LPR is not a complete safe harbor: under Rule 7.3(c) no solicitation is permitted once the target has made known a desire not to be solicited or the solicitation involves coercion, duress, or harassment. Rule 7.3(d) sits outside that analysis: the Rule does not prohibit communications authorized by law or ordered by a court or other tribunal — court-approved notice to potential class members, for example (cmt [8]). The agent rule carries no exception for delegation: if the lawyer can't make the contact directly, no proxy can make it either, and discipline runs to the directing lawyer. Chapter 22 · Pro bono, public service, and the legal system Rule 6.1's 50-hour pro bono target is aspirational — missing it carries no discipline. Under Rule 6.5, the relaxed conflict standard applies only where there is no expectation of ongoing representation; actual knowledge of a conflict still disqualifies. Rule 6.2 requires accepting court appointments unless there is concrete good cause — a busy schedule or personal disagreement isn't enough. Rules 6.3 and 6.4 split by remedy: recuse from the specific vote (6.3) versus disclose anonymously and keep participating (6.4). Rule 8.2's reckless-disregard standard — case law, not the rule's words, equates it with the defamation actual-malice test — protects good-faith criticism but not knowing or reckless falsehoods about the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer, public legal officer or candidate for judicial or legal office. Rule 7.6 bars taking a government legal engagement or an appointment by a judge (a position such as referee, commissioner, special master, receiver, or guardian) where the lawyer or firm gave or solicited political contributions to win such work or be considered for it; the carve-outs are substantially uncompensated service, merit-based RFP selection, and rotation from a list built without regard to donations. Rule 8.4(g) needs all three together: harassment or discrimination on an enumerated ground, knowledge or constructive knowledge that it is, and a connection to the practice of law. Across the integrity rules (Rule 8.4(e)'s claim of improper influence and Rule 8.4(f)'s knowing assistance to a judge's violation included) the statement or act itself is the violation; no victim or corrupt outcome is required. Chapter 23 · Judicial conduct: integrity, impartiality, and duties on the bench Judicial duties (CJC Rule 2.1) take precedence over all outside activities. Exemptions run by Application-section category: a retired judge subject to recall who by law may not practice law is excused from CJC Rule 3.8, and from CJC Rule 3.9 except while serving. Nonverbal conduct — body language, facial expressions directed at a prohibited basis — is a CJC Rule 2.3 violation; the outcome of the ruling doesn't cure it. Reporting duty is tiered: mere suspicion triggers nothing; substantial likelihood of a violation requires appropriate action; actual knowledge of a fitness-level violation requires a mandatory report to the appropriate authority. Reimbursement under CJC Rule 3.14 — necessary and reasonable expenses, including fee or tuition waivers — turns on whether acceptance would appear to a reasonable person to undermine the judge's independence, integrity or impartiality. CJC Rule 3.14 Comment [3] weighs an accredited educational institution or bar association as sponsor rather than a trade association or for-profit entity, funding from numerous contributors rather than a single entity, relation to matters before the judge, and educational character among them; Comment [2]: the call rests on all the circumstances. CJC Rule 3.14(C) requires reporting under CJC Rule 3.15 above the threshold. CJC Rule 2.13 appointments meet adjudication's impartiality and merit standard; the campaign-contribution bar has three narrow exits (CJC 2.13(B)(1)–(3)), the third an affirmative finding by the judge, or another presiding or administrative judge, that no other lawyer is willing, competent and able. Ex parte disclosure attaches to receipt, not reliance; the public-statement restriction under CJC Rule 2.10 continues past the decision, through any appellate process until final disposition. Chapter 24 · Disqualification, extrajudicial activities, and campaigns Disqualification under CJC Rule 2.11 is self-executing — no motion required; any one of the six enumerated grounds triggers it, and CJC Rule 2.11(A) reaches beyond them, listing those circumstances "including but not limited to". Cousins fall outside the third degree, and individual holdings within a mutual or common investment fund fall outside "economic interest" unless the judge participates in managing the interest or the outcome could substantially affect it. CJC Rule 2.11(C) excludes bias or prejudice under paragraph (A)(1) from remittal and names nothing else; personal knowledge of disputed facts sits in the same paragraph but is not in the carve-out. CJC Rule 3.1 bars extrajudicial activity that would appear to a reasonable person to be coercive, and court premises, staff, stationery, equipment or other resources except for incidental use for activities that concern the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice, or as law permits. CJC Rule 3.7 lets the judge request contributions only from the judge's own family or fellow judges not subject to the judge's supervisory or appellate power; mere attendance at a fund-raiser is not a violation. Full-time judges can't serve as private arbitrators or mediators absent express authorization by law (which includes court rules). Unless the law or CJC Rule 3.13(A) prohibits acceptance, gifts from parties, lawyers likely to appear, or others whose interests have come or are likely to come before the judge may be accepted; as value or the source's likelihood of appearing rises, paragraph (A) prohibits the gift rather than reporting curing it (Comment [1]). Accepted gifts must be publicly reported where their value exceeds CJC Rule 3.15's threshold. The personal solicitation ban covers every medium; only the authorized campaign committee may ask for contributions. Ticks are remembered on this device, not in your account.